Nostalgic Nerds Podcast
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Season 3 · Episode 11

Counted as Cast

3 November 2026 · 49 min

Cover art for Counted as Cast

Show notes

Today is Election Day in the US. It feels like this mid-term election carries more weight than other years, so exercise your rights.

Thomas Edison’s first invention was a machine for counting votes, and a committee turned it down because it would have ended their slow roll calls for votes. 

Societies have trusted votes to pottery, liquorice, gears, punch cards and touchscreens. 

Marc and Renee follow that one special step no voter ever gets to see, their ballot being counted the way they cast it, and work out why the best answer anyone has found is a piece of paper you can count again. 

If you’re in the US, go vote. 

We'd love to hear from you. Click here to give us ideas on new episodes.

Join Renee and Marc as they discuss the history of technology, and what it teaches us about now.

email us at nostalgicnerdspodcast@gmail.com

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Full transcript

Auto-generated and lightly edited. Marc & Renee.

Marc: All right. I'll admit I knew almost nothing about voting machines going into this. I'd assumed they were, you know, kind of fairly modern until we did the storage episode where we talked about Herman Hollerith's punch cards counting the 1890 census, and the punch card ballot that was still in about a third of American polling places up until 2000. So the history goes back way further than I had thought.

Renee: I remember the first time I was politically active. That's what I'll say. I worked on the Clinton campaign. Not the re-election campaign, the first campaign. So this is the young guy from Arkansas. He plays the saxophone. He's not an old man. And he's a governor.

Marc: You were like 18, 19.

Renee: And I was 19. And like, yes, I feel I'm hanging around coffee shops in Oakland at the time.

Marc: Like, yes, MTV, the real world.

Renee: Yes. Like, rock the vote. Like, I was out there rocking the vote. Thank you. Right. So, yeah, I remember all that. But I don't remember actually. Voting, right? And in California, I mean, that's how I vote now. It's all by electronic ballot. And so, you know, you can go to the voting booth and fill it all out. I don't know why you would. Or you can take the one they send to you at home and then you fill it all out and then you drop it off at the drop-off box. And so that's how we vote. So we fill it all out at home and then we drop it at the drop-off box. So that's what I'll say. I have no idea what that machine looks like. It's not how I vote. And I'm grateful that I have many ways to vote.

Marc: Yeah, there you go. It's just this weird, like, I can't, and like, let's see, I've voted, I think I've voted in every election I have been able to vote in since I was registered to vote.

Renee: Dude, how much jury duty have you been doing?

Marc: Well, since I don't live in the States, you know, I don't get any jury duty.

Renee: And since I moved to a smaller place, I get it every six months.

Marc: All the time, yeah. But like, I've never voted once, not once in a polling place. Like never not once so for me the machines are quite abstract like i don't know like only the things that i've seen in research and that you know and it's quite abstract so hopefully this episode comes out on election day i'm hoping, um so i'll try to get it um get it done you know and published on tuesday um, in the u.s so tonight it's all about the machinery of voting and the thing Everything that runs through every tech generation of voting machines is trust. We talk about trust a lot, so we're like security nerds as well as just nerds in general.

Renee: Spin around Now let's do it again Trust.

Marc: Trust, Renee. All right.

Renee: Trust is not a control.

Marc: Just so we're clear. That's right.

Renee: Trust is not a control. Go ahead.

Marc: Which was it? Was it the first Bush? Trust but verify?

Renee: No, it was Reagan.

Marc: Was that Reagan? Welcome to another episode of the Nostalgic Nerds Podcast where we talk about tech, past, present, future, Tonight is voting machines. I promise we'll try to be nonpartisan, or at least I'll try to be nonpartisan. But sometimes it's hard to be nonpartisan when a party is, you know, well, you figure it out.

Renee: Oh, I can be nonpartisan, too. But I want to. That's something else. Before we go back, let's talk about what a voting system actually has to do, because it's more than just counting votes for the local water district supervisor.

Marc: How many water district supervisors have you voted for?

Renee: Yeah. Wait, wait. I did vote for something crazy this time. Not even crazy. Something so boring. And this guy was running unopposed. And like, then why are we even picking? Like, we can't not pick him. Even if none of us vote for him, he's going to get the job. His mom's going to vote for him, right? Like, yeah.

Marc: All right. There are two things pulling against each other. First, the ballot has to be secret. And it doesn't have to be. But in, you know, kind of modern Western society, for sure, secret ballots. And there's a reason for that. They have to be secret. So nobody can see how you voted. And then, this is the important part, punish you for it or pay you for it. And second, the count has to be right. And people have to believe it's right. You can get confirmation of quite a lot. Even in Athens, you can watch your vote go into the pile. I vote from the U.K. as an overseas voter in my county in Colorado. I log onto the website, I mark my ballot, save it as a PDF. With my choices on it, I sign a separate affidavit saying I'm entitled to vote and nobody's paying me and whatever. And then I upload two separate files, but I upload both of them. I get an email saying it was received, and then later another one saying it was counted. What I never get is confirmation that it was counted the way that I marked it. Once a ballot is separated from the voter's name, which is what keeps it secret. There's no way to follow it through the count back to them. So there's always one step you can't really watch, which is your ballot being counted the way you cast it. Election security people call it counted as cast. So remember that because we'll come up multiple times in the episode here. Every system in this episode is a different answer to how you get millions of people to trust that step.

Renee: The Athenians had a vote called the Ostracism. Really, ostracism?

Marc: Yes, this is, yes.

Renee: Like kicking your butt out?

Marc: Yes, that's exactly it. That's why it's called that.

Renee: It was like Survivor back then?

Marc: Yes, yes.

Renee: Once a year, the assembly could decide to hold one, and each citizen scratched the name of a politician on a piece of broken pottery, an ostracon. If enough votes were cast, whoever had the most was exiled for 10 years. That seems fair. I'm just going to put it out there. That seems fair. Archaeologists found a—I'm going to start a new party in America, the Athenians. And if we vote you out, you're out for 10 years.

Marc: You're out for 10 years.

Renee: You can't even come—don't even show your face around here.

Marc: You're out for 10 years. Don't even come in.

Renee: Archaeologists found about 190 of those shards in a well on the north slope of Acropolis, all naming Themistocles. Thank you. The general who led the Athens against the Persians, and they were written by only about 14 people. So somebody was handing out ballots that were already filled in.

Marc: Yes.

Renee: Oh, that sounds like... Oh, somebody did that last go around, like last go around, like in Arkansas. I'm not going to say Arkansas, but somewhere down south, somebody was taking your ballot and saying, did you fill that out? Yeah. And they're like, oh, I'll fill it out for you. And then they would fill it in, not even ask you who you wanted to vote for. They would just fill it in who they wanted for.

Marc: Yeah, yeah.

Renee: Yeah, yeah. So somebody was handing out ballots that were already filled in. Historians argue about whether that was an organized effort to get him exiled or just people selling ready-made ballots, ballots to voters who couldn't write. I mean, either way, either way, aren't you kind of gerrymandering in Athens if you're like, let me go after the people who can't read. I'm going to fill out the ballot for them so I can get rid of this guy. You're kind of gerrymandering. It's a Finian gerrymander.

Marc: It is kind of. I mean, what I thought was cool was they figured out by handwriting analysis, like it was 14 people that were scratching names on these pottery, which is like, okay, there's 14 dudes.

Renee: You know what? Only 14 could read and write. It probably wasn't that hard. You know what I mean? Which 14 of you guys can read? And they raised their hands.

Marc: Yeah. Themistocles. Write his name right here.

Renee: Yeah. Right.

Marc: All right. All right. So they also built a machine to stop anyone fixing an outcome. The Claretarion was a stone slab with rows of slots on it. Citizens slotted in their name tickets, and a tube down the side released black and white balls one at a time, and the color decided whether each rose served on a jury that day. Historians still argue about some of the details, but whatever the exact mechanism, it took the choice of who judged a case away from anyone who could be bribed. The Romans had voting tablets. To vote on a law, you were given two, one marked VR, because there's no use in Latin, for uti rogas, as you propose, that's what it means, and one marked A for antiquo, keep the old law. So they would be the conservative, you know, versus sort of change, you know, conservatism, keep the law the same, keep the old law. And you dropped one into an urn. So you had a little VR or an A.

Renee: And Rome had to pass a law to make it secret. Before 139 B.C., Romans electing magistrates told their vote out loud to an official. Law that year, the Lex Gabinia. I got to tell you guys, like he writes these all out phonetically for me and I still get them wrong. But that one wasn't hard. Brought in a secret, a written secret ballot. And historians have argued ever since about whether it cut bribery or it just changed how bribery was actually done. Early America voted out love as well. You stood up, you said your choice, and it was written down in front of everyone, including your employer and your landlord. Kentucky was the last state to do it. Thank you, Kentucky. Until 1891. Even after Americans moved to paper, the parties printed the ballots themselves and in their own colors and designs so party agents at the polling place could see which one you dropped in. So, again, it wasn't. You dropped in a red one. When states required plain white paper, some parties printed on a slightly different shade of white so they could still tell.

Marc: Isn't that awesome? Like the party machine.

Renee: They hack it every time. Exactly. They will hack it every time.

Marc: Yeah.

Renee: They're hacking paper. Yeah. Paper. Mine's going to be a little pinker. Mine's going to be a little bluer.

Marc: Yeah, yeah, exactly. Did you see that Netflix thing with what was, was it Cleveland? Yeah. The the which is was it michael shannon was played um, grover cleveland it was a clevelander oh i haven't watched that yet yeah oh it's good it's good, because it shows like a bunch of the party politics and the machine and how the northeast was this kind of the new york uh machine they control all the customs and you know and the money coming in and out it was really interesting Yeah.

Renee: The Irish. We were good at that.

Marc: And you see this. They show kind of a reenactment of one of these party meetings. And you could tell, like, it's, yeah, there's nothing democratic about it at all.

Renee: No.

Marc: It's really interesting. All right. So the ballot box needed its own security upgrade, too. Ballot box stuffing was common enough that in 1865, a magazine printed a picture. Yeah, you could see this is a very popular picture. Printed a picture of a stuffer's box with a hidden compartment. In the 1850s and 60s, glass ballot boxes caught on so everyone in the room could see there was nothing in the box before the voting started.

Renee: My goodness. The real fix came from our friends of Australia. In 1856, the colonies of Victoria and South Australia both brought in a ballot printed by the government with every candidate's name on it, marked in private, folded before it went in the box. South Australia gave us the habit of marking a cross next to your choice, and it's still called the Australian ballot. Britain adopted the Ballot Act of 1782 with the first secret ballot election to parliament, was by election at Pontefract. Okay, you didn't have to do that one. Yorkshire, that August. The winter, Hugh Childers, had already been elected by secret ballot in Victoria years before. And the ballot box was sealed with a stamp made of licorice because Pontefract was famous for its licorice. The U.S. took it up in 1888, starting with Louisville, Kentucky, and the state of Massachusetts, and it took off from there.

Marc: Yeah, I mean, that's like, you think about it, up until the 1890s, you know, it's totally not mechanical in any way, shape, or form, you know?

Renee: Well, no, you voted, like, yay or nay, like that, and they counted you up, right? Okay, but we were a much smaller country. Sure, sure. And, you know, only men and land, men who own land got to vote. Like, it wasn't everybody. Like, everybody didn't get to vote. Women didn't get to vote. You know, slaves didn't get to vote.

Marc: Yep, not for a while.

Renee: Foreigners didn't get to vote. A lot of people didn't get to vote.

Marc: So the first voting machine came from somebody you've heard of, Renee. Thomas Edison. His first patent granted in June 1869 was an electric vote recorder for legislatures. Each member flipped a switch for yes or no, and the totals came up straight away with no roll call. By Edison's own account, told about 40 years later, he showed it to a committee and the chairman told him that if there was one invention they didn't want, it was this one. Because a slow roll call vote was one of the minority's best ways of blocking bad legislation. Edison said it taught him to only invent things that people actually wanted.

Renee: Okay, here's his second lesson is, like, know your customer, right? That's right. Like maybe if you asked, hey, how do you guys vote? You would never have invented this in the first place, right? Or if you did, you would make it so complicated that it would take forever to use it. And then it would do both purposes. It would slow everything down. I mean, yeah, yeah.

Marc: Isn't that funny?

Renee: Yeah. If only our government today said that about AI. That's all I'll say. The machine that went into polling places was sold as an answer to fraud. Hand counts of, I just had to, I'm sorry, like that voter and fraud. Like that's the only two things we ever hear anymore and it just doesn't exist. So it's so weird to me. The machine that went into polling places was sold as an answer to fraud. Hand counts of paper ballots in big cities had a reputation for being fixed. And the promise of a voting machine was a count nobody could fiddle with. Jacob Meyer from Rochester, New York, patent one in 1889, and it was first used in Lockport, New York in 1892.

Marc: Yeah, okay. I did a lot of research on this part, and it was really interesting to see the pictures. And I saw some YouTube videos on it and stuff, too. It was really neat. So, okay, here's the process. You stepped into a booth and pulled a big lever that closed the curtain behind you. Then you flipped small levers over the names you wanted, and then you pulled the big lever back to open the curtain. The machine added one to a counter for each candidate you'd picked, and then reset itself for the next voter. It wouldn't let you vote for two people for the same office. It also kept no record of any individual ballot, only the totals on the counters. So if a gear jammed or a counter stuck, there was nothing to recount. They lasted a very long time. New York was the last state to retire them, get this, in 2010. And New York's city brought them back for a couple of elections in 2013.

Renee: I'm not going to lie, I've seen those in Pittsburgh. Like, I've seen those.

Marc: Aren't they?

Renee: Yeah, I've seen those. Then punch cards, which we covered in the storage episode. Joseph Harris, a political scientist at Berkeley, adapted an IBM punch card into a ballot in the 1960s, the Vote-O-Matic. Oh, that sounds so 60s. And it was still in about a third of polling places in 2000. In Palm Beach County, Florida, the election supervisor, Teresa Lepore, designed what became known as the Butterfly Ballot, with the candidates spread across two facing pages so the type could be bigger for the county's older voters. Pat Buchanan, the Reform Party candidate, got 3,407 votes there, more than three times his total in any other Florida county, and Buchanan himself said most of those were probably meant for Al Gore. Then there were the hanging chads. This is what I remember from 2000.

Marc: Yeah, yeah.

Renee: The hanging chads. The hanging chads. Okay. Okay. The bits of cards that didn't come all the way out, like that was the hanging chad. So you poked a hole. That hole was supposed to poke that paper all the way through. But if you poked it and it kind of hung on, well, then clearly that's not who you voted for. Like, I'll see it even. Just because it hung on, it doesn't mean that's not who I voted for. I clearly poked that hole. Hanging chads, people. Hanging chads. An entire election hung on a chad. The bits of cards that didn't come all the way out. George W. Bush carried Florida by 537 votes, and the Supreme Court ended the recount on the 12th of December in 2000. Al Gore turns around and says, I invented the Internet. That's all I get. And he conceded.

Marc: I mean, I remember that, too. And because they were doing manual recounts and stuff, it got to the point where the little chads would pop off. And so, you know, like, was that a vote? You know, was that not a vote? Was that one of these mistaken votes, you know, that they didn't mean to that then got, you know, manually counted again? It was it was a total mess.

Renee: It was a mess. Yeah.

Marc: The technology that won out came from school exams. In the 1930s, a Michigan school teacher called Reynolds Johnson built a machine that scored multiple choice tests by sensing the graphite and pencil marks, which conducts just a tiny bit of electricity. IBM bought it. They hired him and sold it from 1937. And that's why everyone's filled in exams with a number two pencil. Scantron.

Renee: Scantron.

Marc: Yeah. The same idea reached ballots in 1962 in Kern City, California, and today a paper ballot read by an optical scanner is how most Americans vote.

Renee: That's how I voted. I filled in little bubbles. After Florida, Congress passed the Help America Act vote in 2002 with nearly $4 billion to help states replace punch cards and lever machines. A lot of counties spent it on touchscreens, which at the time, let's admit, they weren't that great.

Marc: They weren't that great, yeah. Touchscreen voting machines have been around since a Chicago company tested one called the Video Voter in 1974. The industry calls them direct recording electronic machines, or DREs. You touch the screen and a vote goes straight into the machine's memory. Yeah, okay, yeah. Yeah. Many of the ones bought after 2002 printed nothing at all. So the only record of your vote was inside the computer.

Renee: Wait, it's not attached to the internet. Don't worry about it. That's what everybody tells you.

Marc: Okay. Yeah. In fairness, they were faster and easier for voters with disabilities. And they asked everyone to trust software. Nobody outside the company could inspect.

Renee: And the industry didn't help itself because it never does. In 2003, Walden O'Dell, the chief executive of Diebold, the Ohio company that was one of the biggest makers of the machines, wrote in a fundraising letter to Republican donors that he was committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year. His company was about to sell voting machines to Ohio. Diebold's letter later banned its executives from making political contributions. So, like, hey, if you're a CEO, it should be a big no-no. It should be.

Marc: It should be. Especially if you're selling voting machines. Like, you think? Yeah.

Renee: Or, I don't know, use an AI to count it all. Like, whatever you're doing out there, you maniacs, like, just stop it. Stop it. This used to be something we didn't do. Go ahead, Marc. But I think what's interesting,

Marc: I didn't put it in the script here, but it is interesting that like these voting machines, you know, up until you start talking about, you know, Internet and network and memory and stuff like that, the machines themselves, each individual machine had a count. And so each machine had to be retrieved. And then the tally goes from machine to machine to machine. And so you stack that up. And these early kind of electronic machines have the same concept where the count stays in the memory, in the machine. It's not until later that they start to, you know, collect in, you know, networked fashion. So anyways, the security researchers got hold of the machines, these Diebold machines. In 2005, Leon County in Florida, which used Diebold optical scanners, let a Finnish researcher named Harry Hurstie test them with the county's own election chief watching. Using only a memory card he'd prepared in advance, he changed the vote totals, and the printed result tapes and the county's central tallying system both showed the false result. The election chief said he would have certified it. In 2006, a team at Princeton showed that someone with about a minute, alone with a D-Bolt touchscreen, could install software to steal votes and build a version that spread itself from machine to machine on the memory cards. In 2007, California and Ohio both commissioned reviews of every major system and both found serious security failures. California let the touchscreen stay only on strict conditions, And Ohio's Secretary of State recommended getting rid of them at polling places.

Renee: Other countries went through the same thing. In the Netherlands, most people voted on machines made by a Dutch company called NADAP. In 2006, a campaign group called We Don't Trust Voting Computers bought some, reprogrammed one on national television, and showed that radio signals and machine gave off could reveal something about how people voted from a distance. The Netherlands banned the voting computers in 2008 and went back to paper and a red pencil. Germany's constitutional court ruled in 2009 that the machines used in its 2005 elections were unconstitutional because the public was able to check that the votes are recorded and counted correctly without any special expertise. And Ireland spent somewhere between 50 and 55 million euros on about seven and a half thousand of the same machine, used them in a few constituencies 2002 and never used them again and sold them for scrap in 2012 for about 70,000 euros, which works out at roughly nine euros a machine. Yeah, that's a lot. That's a lot of people being like, no, no, this is the way to go. Being like, oh, damn, that's not the way to go.

Marc: That's not the way to go. Yeah, yeah. That thing with the NADAP in the Netherlands, it's called a side channel attack. I didn't put it in the notes there, but like you could do that with like, yeah, terminals, like payment terminals have to have side channel attack protection so that when you're putting your pin in, you can't read the RF, you know, and figure out, oh, it's that. But yeah, if you could do side channel attacks and then determine, you know, which buttons you're pressing, that's no good. So some very large democracies went fully electronic and stayed there. Brazil started in 1996 and has voted entirely on electronic machines since 2000, with results usually in within hours. India first tried electronic voting machines at a by-election in Corolla in 1982. The Supreme Court threw that result out because the law didn't allow the machines yet. But by 2004, they were used in every constituency in the country. That's hundreds of millions of voters on standalone machines that aren't connected to any network, and India later added a printed slip the voter can see.

Renee: In the U.S., the answer turned out to be paper. Ahead of the 2024 election, the Brennan Center for Justice, a law and policy institute, projected about 98% of votes would be cast on paper. Most Americans now mark a paper ballot by hand and a scanner reads it. Britain and most of Europe never really left paper. In the U.K., ballots are still counted by hand overnight in sports halls. Oh, do you guys drink beer while you do that? Because that'd be fun.

Marc: I don't. Yeah, I think not. but that wouldn't surprise me.

Renee: The exception in the U.S. this year is Louisiana, where every polling place still uses paperless machines. The state has set aside about $100 million to replace them, and the rollout is expected to start next year.

Marc: The argument now is over how the paper gets marked. Voters who need help or who prefer it use a ballot marking device, a touchscreen that prints out a paper ballot. Critics point out that most voters never check the printout, and some of those machines count a barcode or a QR code on the ballot instead of the text a person can read. Georgia passed a law to stop counting QR codes from this year and has just pushed it back to 2028. The paper earns its trust because of your ability to audit. In 2008, Philip Stark, a statistician at Berkeley, came up with the risk-limiting audit. After the election, officials pull ballots at random and check them by hand against what the machines recorded. If the sample agrees, they stop. If it doesn't, they keep polling ballots until they either have a strong statistical evidence the reported winner really won, or they've hand-counted the lot. Colorado ran the first statewide one of those in 2017, and a growing minority of states now use them. Behind all of this is a very small industry. Three companies, ES&S, Dominion, and Hart InterCivic, serve roughly 90% of American voters. Dominion was sold in October last year and renamed Liberty Vote. That was a great name. The newest federal standard for voting machine was adopted in 2021, and so far only one or two systems have been certified to it.

Renee: Then there's the question of who's attacking the system. In 2016, Russian military intelligence... Why am I talking about Russian military intelligence? Why am I the one doing this?

Marc: Thank you. I did that on purpose, yeah.

Renee: Then there's the question of who's attacking the system. All right. In 2016, I'm going to do this. Russian military intelligence broke into an Illinois voter registration database, and around 76,000 voters were told their records may have been viewed. The Senate Intelligence Committee, Republicans and Democrats together, concluded in 2019 that Russia had probably scanned election systems in all 50 states. It found no evidence that any votes or vote counts were changed and none of the systems that were breached were used to count votes. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security designated election system as critical infrastructure alongside things like power, water and stadiums. Like, why did that take so long? Why wasn't the election infrastructure part of critical infrastructure from the beginning? Right. Because, you know what, we should just take democracy for granted. Like, let's just do that.

Marc: Yeah, no problem. No problem. There's also a public test every summer. We've talked about DEF CON before, but yeah, this is a big deal at DEF CON. So since 2017, DEF CON, the big hacker convention in Las Vegas, has run a voting village where anyone can try to break into the real voting machines bought secondhand. Every machine they've brought in has been broken into. And one old touchscreen was taken over through Wi-Fi using a Windows XP flaw from 2003. The hackers there get unlimited time and complete physical access, which nobody gets in a real polling place, obviously. What the village has mostly shown is how many known flaws stay unpatched for years, and the researchers there keep recommending paper ballots and audits.

Renee: In November of 2020, the Federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, known as CISA, who currently is running at one-third of its capability because it was doged, put out a joint statement with election officials calling that the election was the most secure in American history and saying there was no evidence of any voting system has been deleted, lost, or changed votes. Five days later, its director, Chris Krebs, was fired. Hey, just out of curiosity, any relation to Brian or no? They're not. They're just Krebs.

Marc: Yeah, I don't know. I should have looked, but I don't know. Yeah. Yeah, I wonder.

Renee: Every time I see Chris Cribb, I think, it kind of looks like.

Marc: Yeah, is that Brian's buddy, you know, brother, you know, cousin, whatever.

Renee: Yeah, like, are they cousins? Like, what? I'm going to look it up now. Now it's going to bug me. It usually bugs me, but then I forget about it. The bigger damage to trust came from claims about the machines. Fox News settled a defamation case brought by Dominion for $787.5 million in 2023, and Newsmax settled with Dominion as well. Some of the breaches came from inside in January 2021, a team hired by lawyers allied with Donald Trump to copy the boating machine software from Coffey County, Georgia. In Colorado, Tina Peters, the elected clerk of Mesa County, who was pardoned by the Colorado governor and is now working with Trump to figure out how to hook and, like, wreck this election, Tina Peters. This is why I'm trying not to be a jerk.

Marc: Yeah, just stick with the script.

Renee: You put Tina Peters in it. The elected clerk of Mesa County was convicted in 2024 over a scheme to give an outsider access to her own county's voting system and sentenced to nine years. The governor commuted her sentence in May. But we have to say this. Yeah. We have to say this. She is now in Washington, D.C., helping people figure out how to steal this election. That's what she's doing with her commuted sentence. She's now in Washington. As I sit here speaking to you, Tina is in Washington, D.C., and the election is the day after tomorrow.

Marc: Yeah, you'd think that, like, it doesn't even matter what side of the aisle you're on, right? You'd think that somebody that was convicted, you know, and was sentenced in nine years for voter, you know, voter tampering, voter fraud.

Renee: At 71 years old, she was convicted in nine years. That shows you what she did. Yeah.

Marc: And she should not be allowed to, you know, consult about elections. I'm sorry. Like, that's just, yeah. Anyways, all right. So federal support has been cut back. Like, in February 2025, CISA put its election security staff on leave, and the roughly $10 million a year it's spent, it's $10 million, people. Like, it's not much. It's not much. You know? We should be spending that and more. Anyways, roughly $10 million a year it's spent on information-sharing center that warns local election office about the threats that ended that March. Congress put that money back in this year's budget, okay? And in September, Senator Alex Medea said none of it had been paid out. The administration's budget for next year proposes ending CISA's election program altogether.

Renee: They're trying to end CISA altogether, so it doesn't surprise me that they're trying to end that either. And there's been a fight over the rules themselves. In March 2025, the president signed an executive order requiring proof of citizenship to register on the federal form, telling the Election Assistance Committee to stop machines counting barcodes. A federal judge permanently blocked the citizenship requirement last October. In August of 2025, the president said he'd sign an order against mail-in ballots and voting machines, and the order on machines never came. An order on mail voting followed this margin. In September, the Supreme Court left a Lover Courts block in place. So mail voting in this election works the way it did before, luckily for the president, because that's how he votes.

Marc: That's how he voted. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, that's how the pope voted.

Renee: Isn't that amazing? It's our first pope that ever voted in an American election.

Marc: First American pope, first vote. Anyways, yeah, online voting is already here for some people. So, you know, what's next? The way I vote from the UK, which I just described at the start. I could have done on my phone. You know, I think I used an iPad. So, you know, electronic voting via app or, website, you know, it's here. A lot of states, Colorado included, let military and overseas voters send their ballot back electronically because posts from abroad is too slow and too unreliable. My ballot and the affidavit with my name on it go in as two separate files, but through the same web form at the same time. So I, personally, I'm trusting the county to keep them apart. What almost every election security expert is against is opening that up to everyone. You'd have to keep the ballot secret, know the device it was cast on hadn't been tampered with, know nobody was standing there over the voter at home, and still show it was counted as cast. And nobody has managed all of that at scale. Estonia has let everyone vote over the internet since 2005, and its answer to someone being pressured at home is to let you vote again, online or in person, with only your last vote counting. And it's still the exception, though. So West Virginia tried a voting app called Votes, V-O-A-T-Z, Votes, for overseas military voters in 2018. And MIT researchers said in 2020 that someone in control of the phone could see or change votes. Like, yeah, like if you've got a screen scraper or something, of course, you know. Votes disputed it, and West Virginia has already stopped using it.

Renee: Germany's court put the standard in a way anyone can apply. Whatever the machine is, an ordinary person with no special knowledge has to be able to check that the votes were counted the way they were cast. Paper, you can recount, does that. A sealed box of gears didn't, and neither did a touchscreen that didn't print anything out. I guess, like, that's it, right? Like, we track our vote, right? But it is, I mean, the only thing that has my name on it when I go to vote in the state of California, is the envelope on the outside. That's the affidavit. The affidavit is printed on the envelope. The envelope says, I hereby swear to God, I'm an American citizen. I've only voted once. I'm not. I don't have any felonies. And I sign it and I drop it in the Dropbox. But from the minute they take it out of the Dropbox, they compare my signature to my driver's license. It proves I am who I am. They separate my ballot from that envelope and you never know again that that's Renee Murphy. Yeah.

Marc: Well, and it's got the, from what I remember, right, it's got the little security envelope, you know, the thingy-mabobber.

Renee: I get these back. Yeah, I get these back. That's my receipt. And so I use this to look it up online. Yeah. Right?

Marc: So, yeah.

Renee: I can see where it's at in the process. I can see it was delivered. It was part of this count. It's now in this box for this storage. I know all that. I know all that. I don't know what the actual outcome was. Like, you voted blue. You're part of the blue tsunami. I don't know that that'll be true, but that's what I said.

Marc: Yeah, I don't know. I don't know. I mean, and before we started recording, we were talking about, like, yeah, there's, like, votes are secret. Ballots, the ballot is secret, I should say. But, you know, with the big data and, you know, things like Palantir, you know, Facebook data, you know, political contributions, things that you like, things that you follow.

Renee: Nine data brokers. have your data if you don't think they can use that and throw it through an llm who's really good at like you know like correlation things yeah like don't think they can't come back and be like oh check it out renee's a democrat she tries to hide it once in a while by shopping at walmart but don't fall for it she's a democrat just she's not gonna pay big money for kool-aid that's all it is that's that's my only reason for a relationship with walmart eight dollar kool-aid Like, that's it. That's it. That's it. That's all I bought in there. Go look it up. That's it. Otherwise, I'm a Democrat. But I think, like, that's it, right? Like, that... Yeah, I... And what happened after Edward Snowden, right? Like Edward Snowden breached all that data from NSA, right? And what did the Russians do? The next day they were like, no more computers. We're going back to typewriters. They're pulling the typewriters out of storage because they figured to get 10 terabytes of paper out of the KGB, they'd notice. 10 terabytes of data. Nobody would know. Nobody knows. Yeah. So like, then don't use data. Like, don't use, don't, paper takes up more space, it's heavier, then do that. Right? Like, you know, the chances of that being exposed, like, we can keep track of people. We can keep track of papers. We cannot let you take anything home. It's easier when it's a giant bin. It's harder when it's a thumbtie. Right?

Marc: I mean, that's the thing, you know, it's, I mean, when we talked about in the storage episode, you know, things on paper, paper takes up space. And so the value is directly correlated to how long it gets stored and what. Form it gets stored and all that. But like, this is important stuff, you know, and especially I think in this day and age where, you know, particularly in the West that there's threats, you know, there's, you know, people wanting to know how you voted so they can come after you. That's not okay. Yeah.

Renee: Yeah. Well, yeah, right. They say that right now, this has been the largest leftist surveillance state we've ever been under. That just the way our government uses data right now, especially Department of Homeland Security, that they're not doing what they're supposed to be doing. They're monitoring leftists. Yeah.

Marc: I mean, well, yeah, it's hard to say, you know. You know, who's a quote-unquote leftist, you know?

Renee: Yeah, right? Like, God help you if you don't want a data center in your backyard, right? Yeah, I mean,

Marc: If you criticize a policy, you're, you know, you're some radical or whatever.

Renee: Leftist terrorist. Yeah. I'm Antifa.

Marc: Anyways, yeah. I didn't want it to go that way.

Renee: Here's what I would say to anybody who listens to this in any other part of the world. If you think America is sleeping through this, I could tell you that's not what it feels like here.

Marc: Yeah, that's not what it is.

Renee: And i would say we are a group of people that understand what it means to rattle the monkey cage and we're just not going to rattle the monkey cage until we have to right like i don't want an angry monkey throwing feces at me until i like until it has to happen and so like i think until it happens we're not gonna we're not gonna rattle the monkey cage we're all gonna hold because here's what happens like it's yes the monkey will spit on me and throw feces but this monkey in particular might drop a nuclear bomb on Iran, right? Like, it's a completely different monkey with a completely different pile of feces. And so it's really hard. It's really hard to be opinionated and, you know, and stand up for yourself when you think doing that would result in horrific things happening to other people. Like, that's not okay. And that's what it kind of feels like.

Marc: But I think, you know, the, it's, I don't know.

Renee: It's so- yeah

Marc: I know but like I guess you know the thing is that, Yeah. People are watching this stuff, you know, right now. And, you know, I can't remember what I was watching, but somebody said, you know, voting is one of the most American things ever. Yeah. And so it's important, you know, and when I wrote all this stuff, you know, I did try to make sure I looked at it from a global perspective, but there's so much focus because of, you know, the U.S. half-term is right now. So, but that's, you know, we have to think about, This is our voice, you know? And if people are trying to mess with it, that's not okay. So it's good to be educated about the process and the system. So anyways. All right. Sorry. Back to the script. Yeah.

Renee: Wait, before we get back to the script, just real quick. I don't want anybody to think that they shouldn't trust their local government.

Marc: Yeah, exactly.

Renee: That they shouldn't trust their local poll people. That they shouldn't trust their local count. Of course you should. These are your neighbors. There is nothing on earth that makes me think I shouldn't trust my neighbor. There's nothing, right? And I live in a sea of red in the middle of California. Like, I don't live in a blue city, like not even close. But I trust my neighbors. I trust my neighbors to be fair and equitable and kind. And, you know, I expect them to do what they're supposed to do. And they're going to. There's nothing. Please don't think that anything we told you means you shouldn't trust machines. You shouldn't trust ballots. You shouldn't trust. None of that is true. Please go vote. Vote, vote, vote, vote, vote.

Marc: And that's why there's the processes in place. That's why people are moving to these machines that print things out that then you can audit, or moving to paper that you can audit. And none of the research over the last several elections shows any significant amount of fraud. This is not the 1800s where there was legitimate ballot stuffing and there was legitimate people buying, bribing people to vote. And it's not like that.

Renee: It's not 190 or 139 BC either where we're going to vote you out for 10 years and you've got to leave town.

Marc: None of that is what's happening here. Yeah. What did it say? In 2019, it was the most secure and reliable election ever. So that's great. I think that's good. And we want to make sure that that continues. All right. Every step made the count faster. Athenians counted pottery by hand. Lever machines gave you totals the moment the polls closed. Brazil has a national result within hours. Each step let more people vote and got the result out quicker. And each one asked voters to trust something they couldn't see inside. First the person counting, then the gears, then the software. Most of the democratic world has landed on the same answer, a mark on paper you can go back and count again, and a machine to count it fast, and an audit to check the machine.

Renee: Trust gets damaged as easily by what people believe about the machines as by anything the machines do. Okay, let me just explain this real quick. Trust is like a battery, right? You keep doing good and the battery gets more and more full and people trust you and trust you and trust you. And they'll trust you to the point where if you were Patagonia and tomorrow, the clothing company, and tomorrow you got caught with child labor, I will bet you $30 million they get out of it. And all I have to say is, oh, my God, who knew that? Let me go audit. This will never happen again. And you know what? Because their trust battery is so full, we would be like, absolutely, I trust you. Right? What we're doing right now is like, yes, trust gets damaged as easily by what people believe about the machines as anything the machines do. We don't have a battery that's full. We have a battery that's blinking red and almost empty, and they're going to go make us try to trust it one more time. Like my gas tank is like, Brene, pull over or you're going to have to call your dad. And I'm like, no, no, I got five more miles.

Marc: I don't want to call my dad.

Renee: Yeah. Like, I'm still not pulling over, though, so I don't know how it's going to go. No, you know how this is going to go. I'm going to run out of gas. Right. So, yeah. OK, so that's it. Right. The Senate found no votes changed in 2016. The federal agency called 2020 the most secure election in American history. Fox still paid three quarters of a billion dollars over what was said about those machines. The machinery has been getting more trustworthy for 20 years, and convincing people of that has turned out to be harder than building the thing to begin with.

Marc: Yeah, that's, I think that's the, that's the, that's earth right there. It's been getting more trustworthy for decades now.

Renee: But you can't convince anybody that's true.

Marc: That's right. Yeah, which is tough. So, yeah. So don't, don't believe the hype. Don't believe the hype. All right. So if you've got a story about a voting machine or the strangest place you've ever voted, write to us at nostalgicnerdspodcast at gmail.com. And if you're in the U.S. and haven't voted yet, the polls are open today. If I get this out on Tuesday.

Renee: If he gets it out on Wednesday, you'd be like, Renee's really mad. I'm glad it turned out okay. Or Renee's really mad. We should check on her. Like, I don't know how much it's going to go, but this is the Sesthetic Nerd Podcast. Thanks for tuning in. Subscribe, follow, don't forget the merch, and share this with someone who stills remember pulling the big lever. You guys will see you next time. Happy Election Day.

Marc: Go vote. Go vote.

Renee: Rock all the names that you choose, pull it on back, it goes